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A SHIELD, NOT A SWORD: INVOLUNTARY LEAVE
UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
Megan E. Blomquist
Abstract- Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), covered employers
must grant an eligible employee's request for up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a
new baby or an ill family member, or to accommodate the employee's own serious health
condition. The statute prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or denying an
employee's right to FMLA leave. Neither the statute itself nor its regulations directly address
the practice of involuntary leave, a term that has been used to describe instances where an
employer designates the leave of a qualifying employee as FMLA leave without an employee
request or against the employee's wishes and instances where an employer places a non-
qualifying employee on FMLA leave. The few federal courts that have examined this issue
have failed to make this distinction and have interpreted the statute's silence to permit
employers to put employees on involuntary FMLA leave in both instances. This Comment
examines the text of the FMLA, its implementing regulations, and its legislative history to
ascertain both Congress's intent and the Department of Labor's interpretation regarding
involuntary leave. This Comment concludes that employers who put non-qualifying
employees on involuntary FMLA leave violate the FMLA's prohibition on employer
interference with employees' FMLA rights.
After recovering from complicated brain surgery to repair two
aneurysms, Ed Keating' returned to his job as a freight handler in the
receiving department of a volume discount store. Although Mr. Keating
suffered some permanent short-term memory impairment as a result of
the surgery, he successfully performed his essential job functions for the
next nine years. However, when a new supervisor began assigning him
new and more complex tasks, Mr. Keating found he needed minor
accommodations such as a daily task list. Despite Mr. Keating's
willingness and demonstrated ability to work with only minor
accommodations, his employer placed him on twelve weeks of unpaid
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)2 while it
purportedly determined whether accommodations were necessary and
feasible. During this leave, Mr. Keating had no income and did not
qualify for unemployment benefits. As a result, he had no choice but to
declare bankruptcy when he could not pay his creditors.
1. This illustration is loosely based on a case pending in the District Court for the Western District
of Washington.
2. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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Given the prospect of twelve weeks without income, most employees
in this situation would be forced to resign and seek work elsewhere.
Even if Mr. Keating had found another job, he still would have been
unable to take time off later that year in the event of another illness in his
family, because he would no longer have been eligible for FMLA leave.
Had Mr. Keating's employer ultimately agreed to accommodate his
disability and return him to his position, he eventually may have been
able to recoup some of his financial losses and restore his economic
security, but he would have been similarly unable to take FMLA leave
later that year. In either case, Mr. Keating would have lost something of
great value: his annual entitlement to FMLA leave.
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to take twelve weeks of unpaid
leave per year for specific reasons,' including the employee's own
serious health condition, and to return to the same or an equivalent
position upon completion of leave.' Examined in light of the legislative
history, the statutory provisions and accompanying regulations make
clear the FMLA's intent to grant employees a right to request leave when
they find it necessary. The exercise of this right cannot be waived,'
interfered with, restrained, or denied.6 Nevertheless, in situations such as
Mr. Keating's, employers have used the FMLA as a sword to deal with
difficult or undesirable employees by placing them on involuntary
FMLA leave. The few courts that have examined the issue of involuntary
leave, where an employer places an employee who does not meet the
statutory requirements on FMLA leave, have held that such a practice
does not violate the employee's FMLA rights.7
Part I of this Comment examines the development and implementation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Part II analyzes court decisions
3. Employees may use their annual FMLA leave entitlement for a variety of reasons, including
caring for a newly born or adopted child, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (b)(2) (1994), caring for a family member
with a serious health condition, and caring for the employee's own serious health condition, id.
§ 2601 (a)(I). Employees most often use FMLA leave because of their own serious health condition.
COMMISSION ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 94 (1996) [hereinafter A WORKABLE BALANCE]
Because the issue of involuntary FMLA leave typically arises in situations involving an employee's
own serious health condition, the other reasons for FMLA leave are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2000).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
7. See, e.g., Love v. City of Dallas, No. 3:96-CV-0532-R, 1997 WL 278126, at *6 (N.D. Tex.
May 14, 1997).
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addressing involuntary leave, including cases both in which the
employee had an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition and in
which the employee was able to perform essential job functions and thus
did not have a qualifying serious health condition. Applying principles of
statutory interpretation and analyzing the Department of Labor's (DOL)
regulations and advisory opinions, Part I critically evaluates the
reasoning used in existing decisions on involuntary FULA leave. It also
considers the policy ramifications of permitting employers to put
employees on involuntary FMLA leave. This Comment concludes that
the statute, its accompanying regulations, and DOL advisory opinions
prohibit employers from deducting leave from an employee's annual
FMLA leave allotment when the employee does not have an FMLA-
qualifying serious health condition. In light of these provisions and the
statute's overall purpose of providing greater job security to employees
with serious health conditions, employers who place non-qualifying
employees who are willing and able to work on FMLA leave interfere
with employees' FMLA rights in violation of the statute.
I. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
President Clinton signed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
into law on February 5, 1993,8 making it the first major piece of
legislation of his administration. 9 The text of the statute does not directly
address the issue of involuntary FMLA leave, whereby an employer
places a non-qualifying employee on FMLA leave. However, it does
describe the process by which employees may avail themselves of their
FMLA rights, as well as the penalties for employer interference with
these rights. The regulations issued by the DOL also fail to address
involuntary FMLA leave explicitly, but do provide relevant guidance
regarding designation of leave and intermittent leave. The DOL has
issued a number of advisory opinions interpreting these regulations in
light of specific employment situations, thereby illustrating their
intended application. The legislative history of the FMLA describes the
evolution of the statute and offers insight into its purpose, revealing
8. See President's Statement on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. DOC. 144 (Feb. 5, 1993).
9. Jill Zuckman, As Family Leave Is Enacted, Some See End to Logam, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
267,267 (1993).
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Congress's intent to instill rights in employees and safeguard those
rights.
A. Provisions of the FMLA
The FMLA seeks to balance the demands of the workplace with the
needs of families ° and to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for
medical reasons or to care for a new baby or ill family member." The
FMLA contains detailed provisions describing employee leave entitle-
ments and permissive employer rights. The statute also prohibits certain
acts by employers and provides extensive remedies to employees seeking
enforcement of their FMLA rights. Courts have interpreted this provision
to prohibit employers from forcing employees to forfeit other employ-
ment benefits in exchange for FMLA leave and from interfering with
employee scheduling of FMLA leave. Finally, the statute's construction
provisions indicate that courts should liberally construe the FMLA in
favor of employees.
1. Mandatoty Employee Rights and Permissive Employer Rights
Under the FMLA
In passing the FMLA, Congress determined there was inadequate job
security for employees whose serious health conditions temporarily
prevented them from working. 2 Accordingly, the FMLA creates
mandatory leave rights for employees and grants limited permissive
rights to employers to prevent fraud and protect the employer's economic
viability."'
10. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).
I. Id. § 2601(b)(2).
12. Id. § 2601 (a)(4). Congress had earlier extended job opportunities to persons with disabling
health conditions under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). The ADA defines
"disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more.., major life
activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2000).
Under the ADA, employers may not discriminate against qualified individuals with disabilities, and
employers have an affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodation to such individuals,
unless the employer can demonstrate that to do so would cause the employer undue hardship. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A).
13. The FMLA uses the term "shall" with regard to employees' rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)
(stating that "eligible employee shall be entitled" to twelve weeks of leave); id. § 2614(a)(1) (stating
that "eligible employee.., shall be entitled" to be restored the same or an equivalent position on
return from leave). In contrast, the statute uses the term "may" with regard to employer rights. Id.
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The FMLA entitles eligible employees who work for covered
employers to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually for
specific qualifying reasons. While the FIILA guarantees twelve weeks of
unpaid leave, an employee may elect or an employer may require the
employee to substitute paid leave for unpaid leave." The reasons for
taking FMLA leave include the birth or adoption of a child; caring for a
seriously ill child, parent, or spouse; and attending to the employee's
own serious health condition. 5 The statute defines "serious health
condition" as an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental
condition that involves inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health
care provider. 6 The statute also requires that the serious health condition
make the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her
position. 7 Where the leave is for the employee's own serious health
condition, the employee is alternatively permitted to take leave on an
intermittent or reduced schedule basis.' An employee is eligible for
leave when he or she has been employed by a covered employer for at
least twelve months and has worked at least 1250 hours for that employer
during the previous twelve months. 9 Covered employers include private
employers who employ at least fifty employees for each working day
during twenty or more calendar weeks of the current or preceding year,
as well as federal, state, and local governments.2' Employees returning
§ 2613(a)(1) (stating that "employer may require" certification from employee's health care
provider); id. § 2614(b)(1) (stating that "employer may deny restoration" of highly compensated
employee to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to employer's operations). Use of the
term "may" is usually precatory, whereas use of the term "shall" is mandatory. See, e.g., Mallard v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296,301-02 (1989).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d). Various forms of employer-provided paid leave may be substituted,
including vacation, personal, family, and sick leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207. The employer may
designate the substituted paid leave as FMLA leave and thus count it against the employee's annual
FMLA allotment pursuant to the designation procedures in 29 C.F.R. § 825.208.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
16. Id. § 2611 (1 1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). This is the requirement that is usually at issue in involuntary-leave
cases. Thus, the use of the term "non-qualifying employee" in this Comment refers to an employee
who is, in fact, able to perform the essential functions of his or her position.
18. Id. § 2612(b)(1).
19. Id. § 2611(2)(A).
20. Id. § 261 l(4)(A). Limiting coverage to employers with fifty or more employees made the
statute, at the time of its enactment, applicable to approximately ten percent of private sector
employers, who employed nearly sixty percent of the private sector workforce. A WORKABLE
BALANCE, supra note 3, at 58-60. Some members of Congress have sought to expand coverage to
include employers with twenty-five or more employees, which would cover thirteen million more
employees, an additional fourteen percent of the workforce. See, e.g., S. 183, 105th Cong. (1997).
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from leave are entitled to return to the same position they held before
taking leave or an equivalent position.2 In addition, during any FMLA
leave period, eligible employees are entitled to maintain their benefits
under the employer's group health plan.2-
The FMLA grants employers a limited set of permissive rights that
allow an employer to verify the employee's need for leave and preserve
its economic viability. To prevent fraud or abuse, an employer may
require employees seeking FMLA leave for their own serious health
condition to provide medical certification from a health care provider,23
periodic status reports,24 and certification of the employee's ability to
return to work following the leave period. Employers may also preserve
the economic viability of their businesses by denying restoration of
certain highly compensated employees following a period of FMLA
leave if such denial is necessary to prevent substantial and grievous
economic injury to the employer's operations. 26 Additionally, the
employer may recover premiums paid for group health plan coverage for
an employee on FMLA leave if the employee fails to return to work after
the leave period has expired.27 However, in contrast to the mandatory
rights granted to employees, the language of the statute expressly
indicates that the rights granted to employers are permissive.28
21. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). An "equivalent position" is one that has equivalent employment
benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. Id. § 2614(a)(l)(B).
22. Id. § 2614(c)(1). Employers and employees both maintain their existing contributions to the
payment of group health care premiums during the employee's leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.209
(2000).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a).
24. Id. § 2614(a)(5).
25. Id. § 2614(a)(4). The employer may only impose this requirement if it is uniformly applied.
Id.
26. Id. § 2614(b). A "highly compensated employee" is a salaried employee who is among the
highest-paid ten percent of the employees employed within seventy-five miles of the facility where
the employee is employed. Id.
27. Id. § 2614(c)(2). However, if the employee fails to return to work because of the continuation,
recurrence, or onset of a serious health condition, or because of circumstances beyond the
employee's control, the employer may not recover premiums paid to maintain the employee's group
health coverage during the period of FMLA leave. Id.
28. See, e.g., id. § 2612(b)(2) ("[E]mployer may require such employee to transfer tempo-
rarily ... "); id. § 2613(a) ("[E]mployer may require that a request for leave ... be supported by
certification .... "); see also supra note 13.
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2. Prohibited Employer Acts and Liability for Violations of
Employees' FEMLA Rights
In addition to describing what employers must do under the FMLA,
the statute also describes what they cannot do. The FMLA prohibits
interference with, restraint of, and denial of employees' FMLA rights.
Courts have held that employers who delay granting an employee's
FMLA leave request or force an employee to forfeit other employment
benefits in exchange for FMLA leave violate the employee's FMLA
rights. The statute provides for both agency and private enforcement of
this provision. Employers are strictly liable for violations of employees'
FMLA rights, and violations entitle employees to an array of remedies,
including both monetary damages and equitable relief.
a. The FMLA 's Prohibition ofInterference with, Restraint, or Denial
ofEmployee FMLA Rights
Section 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA expressly prohibits employers from
interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of or attempt to
exercise any rights granted to employees under the FMLA. 29 The statute
also contains a retaliation provision, which prohibits employers from
discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual for
opposing any practice made unlawful by the FMLA.3" In addition to
providing for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor,3' the FMLA grants
employees a private right of action to enforce their FMLA rights 2 and
specifically contemplates class action suits for groups of similarly
situated employees.33 Courts have concluded that employers guilty of
interfering with, restraining, or denying employees' FMLA rights are
strictly liable for any such violations.34 Under this standard, an employee
29. Id. § 2615(a)(1). Neither the statute nor the regulations define the terms "interfere,""restrain,"
and "deny." The legislative history also fails to explain the meaning of these terms. See S. REP. No.
103-3, at 34-35 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,36-37; H.R. REP. No. 103-8(1), at 46.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). While the legislative history says nothing about how to construe
§ 2615(a)(1), it indicates that Congress modeled § 2615(a)(2), the opposition clause, after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), and intended it to be construed
in the same manner. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 34, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 36.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b).
32 Id. § 2617(a)(2)(A).
33. Id. § 2617(a)(2)(B).
34. Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'I Hosp., 946 F. Supp. 988, 996-97 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (examining
language and legislative history of FMLA and concluding that both point toward strict liability
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need not prove anything regarding the employer's intent in violating the
statute;3" the employee need only prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employer deprived him or her of a benefit to which he
or she was entitled under the statute.3 6
In construing § 2615(a)(1), courts have found that certain acts not
expressly prohibited by the statute nonetheless constitute violations of
employee rights. For example, in Mardis v. Central National Bank &
Trust ofEnid,37 the Tenth Circuit held that forcing an employee to forfeit
other employment benefits, such as accrued paid sick leave and vacation
time, in order to take FMLA leave to care for her seriously ill husband
interfered with the employee's FMLA rights. 8 Also, in Sherry v.
Protection, Inc.,39 the district court found that delaying a decision on an
employee's requests for FMLA leave constituted denial of the
employee's FMLA rights, even where the employer ultimately granted
the leave request.4° Similarly, the court in Williams v. Shenango4" held
that where the employee requested a particular week off to care for his
seriously ill spouse, the employer's denial of the request interfered with
the employee's FMLA rights, despite the fact that the employer granted
the request for leave during a different week.42 These cases all suggest
that an employee has the unilateral right to decide when he or she needs
FMLA leave and an employer cannot compel the surrender of other
employment benefits.
b. Employer Liability for Violations of Employees'FMLA Rights
Employers who violate employees' FMLA rights face serious
penalties, including liability for the employee's wages and out-of-pocket
expenses, double damages, equitable relief, and attorney's fees. The
standard); see also Williams v. Shenango, 986 F. Supp. 309, 317-18 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (adopting
Kaylor's reasoning and applying strict liability standard for violations of § 2615(a)(1)).
35. See Kaylor, 946 F. Supp. at 996-7.
36. Id.
37. 173 F.3d 864, text available at 1999 WL 218903 (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 1999) (unpublished table
decision).
38. Id. at *2; see also Goodwin-Haulmark v. Menninger Clinic, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242
(D. Kan. 1999).
39. 981 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Il1. 1997).
40. Id. at 1136.
41. 986 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
42. Id. at 320-21.
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statute explicitly provides for multiple legal remedies: lost wages, salary,
employment benefits, or other compensation. 3 The employer also may
be liable for other economic losses sustained by the employee, such as
out-of-pocket medical expenses.' Furthermore, employers must pay
interest on money damages for both lost compensation and out-of-pocket
expenses.45 Congress further emphasized the gravity of employer viola-
tions of employee FMLA rights by creating a presumption that
employers who violate such rights are liable to the employee for an
additional amount of liquidated damages, equal to the sum of the two
types of damages described above, plus interest.4 6 To overcome this
presumptive liability for double damages, the employer must prove that
it acted in good faith and with reasonable grounds for believing it was
not in violation of the FMLA.47 Employees may also seek equitable relief
for violations of their FMLA rights,48 which may include employment,
reinstatement, or promotion.49 Finally, employees who prevail in FMLA
enforcement actions receive reasonable attorney's fees, reasonable
expert-witness fees, and other costs.50 This award of fees and costs to a
prevailing plaintiff is mandatory,5 even where an employee receives
only nominal damages.5 2
3. The FMLA 's Liberal Construction Provisions
The FMLA's construction provisions demonstrate Congress's intent to
provide for and protect employees. The FMLA sets a minimum standard,
a floor beneath which employee leave benefits may not drop.53 The
43. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(A)(i)() (1994).
44. Id. § 2617(a)(l)(A)(i)(I1).
45. Id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(ii).
46. Id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 2617(a)(l)(B).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 2617(a)(3).
51. See S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 36 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38 (noting that
FMLA's fee-shifting provision is modeled after FLSA provision and that award of attorney's fees
under FLSA is "mandatory and unconditional").
52. See McDonnell v. Miller Oil Co., 968 F. Supp. 288, 293, 295 (E.D. Va. 1997) (reducing
attorneys' fees award by ten percent to $19,698.81 in case involving employee to whom jury had
awarded $2.00 in damages), aff'd, 110 F.3d 60 (4th Cir. 1997), remanded, 134 F.3d 638 (4th Cir.
1998) (ordering trial court to consider further reducing award of attorneys' fees).
53. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4-5, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6-7.
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FMLA states that nothing in the Act shall be construed to modify or
affect any federal or state law prohibiting discrimination. 4 The FMLA
also specifies that it shall not be construed to supersede any state or local
law55 or collective bargaining agreement or other benefit program56 that
provides greater family or medical leave rights to employees. Finally, the
FMLA is not meant to discourage employers from adopting or retaining
leave policies that are more generous than those contained in the
statute.
B. Department ofLabor Regulations and Advisory Opinions Relevant
to Involuntary FMLA Leave
Congress vested the Secretary of Labor with authority to administer
the FMLA.58 While the DOL's regulations do not specifically address
involuntary leave, numerous regulatory provisions guarantee employee
FMLA rights while allowing certain protections for employers.
Regulations regarding the designation of leave and the amount of leave
to be charged in cases of intermittent leave shed light on the issue of
involuntary leave. In addition, the DOL has issued advisory opinions to
employers seeking guidance on how to interpret the FMLA in particular
circumstances. One such advisory opinion affirmed that employers may
designate FMLA leave as such when the employer and employee have
satisfied all of the statutory requirements for leave. Two additional
opinions held that when an employee is on intermittent FMLA leave,
employers may not deduct more leave from the employee's annual
FMLA allotment than is necessary to meet the employee's specific
qualifying need.
1. FMLA Regulations and Department ofLabor Advisory Opinions
Regarding Designation ofLeave as FMLA Leave
While the DOL's FMLA regulations do not expressly address
involuntary leave, the regulations do describe the process by which an
employer may charge leave against an employee's annual FMLA leave
54. 29 U.S.C. § 265 1(a).
55. Id. § 2651(b).
56. Id. § 2652(a).
57. Id. § 2653.
58. Id. § 2654.
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allotment. The FMLA regulations extensively address the employer's
designation of leave as FMLA leave, which occurs in response to an
employee's request for leave or upon receipt of information from the
employee or his or her spokesperson indicating a need and desire to take
FMLA leave.59 According to the regulations, "(i)n all circumstances, it is
the employer's responsibility to designate leave, paid or unpaid, as
FMLA-qualifying, and to give notice of the designation to the
employee., 60 The regulations explain that the employer must base this
designation solely on information received from the employee or the
employee's spokesperson. 6' Thus, while the regulations give the
employer the responsibility for designating leave as FMLA leave, this
responsibility only arises upon receipt of information from the employee
or his or her spokesperson indicating a need and desire to take leave.62 A
sample form entitled "Employer Response to Employee Request for
Family and Medical Leave" further evidences this procedure.63
In a 1995 advisory opinion,' the DOL addressed the specific issue of
whether an employer may designate leave as FMLA leave if the
employee has not requested that it be designated as such. The opinion
stated that if the employer meets the definition of a covered employer,
the employee meets the definition of an eligible employee, and the
reason for the leave meets the definition of a serious health condition,
then the employer may designate the leave as FMLA leave and count it
against the employee's twelve-week entitlement, even if the employee
has not requested that it be counted as such 5 This opinion affirmed that
59. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 (2000). Designation is the process by which the employer determines
whether the leave is for an FMLA-qualifying reason and thereby counts the leave against the
employee's annual twelve-week leave entitlement. id.
60. Id. § 825.208(a).
61. Id.
62- See, e.g., id. § 825.208(a)(1) (Noting that employee must give notice of need for unpaid
FMLA leave to employer); id. ("[lin explaining the reasons for a request to use paid leave... an
employee will provide sufficient information for the employer to designate the paid leave as FMLA
leave."); see also id. § 825.208(a)(2) (referring to employee's request or notification to employer of
intent to use accrued paid leave); id. ("[Ain employee.., who-seeks an extension of unpaid leave
for an FMLA-qualifying purpose will need to state the reason.").
63. Id. § 825 app. D, Form WH-381 (2000).
64. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3067, Op. FMLA-68 (July 21, 1995).
65. Id. A prior DOL advisory opinion indicated that an employer's decision to make FMLA leave
mandatory for employees taking leave for a qualifying reason was permissible under the statute but
not required. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3044, Op. FMLA-49 (Oct. 27, 1994). A subsequent
opinion confirmed that it is the employer's prerogative to designate leave as FMLA leave, and that
an employee may not bar the employer from designating any qualifying absence as FMLA leave. 99
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the employer may designate leave as FMLA leave and count it against an
employee's annual allotment only where the employer and employee
satisfy all of the statutory prerequisites.
2. Regulations and DOL Advisory Opinions Regarding the
Calculation ofIntermittent FMLA Leave
When an employee takes leave on an intermittent or reduced schedule
basis,66 the regulations specify that only the amount of leave actually
taken counts toward the annual twelve-week leave entitlement.67 Thus, if
an employee needs only two hours off for an FMLA-qualifying medical
appointment, an employer may only deduct those two hours from the
employee's FMLA leave balance. This is true even where the nature of
the employee's job prevents him or her from returning to work for the
remainder of the workday.68 For example, if a flight attendant has a
qualifying two-hour medical appointment in the morning that results in
missing the flight on which he or she was to work that day, the employee
can nonetheless only be charged with two hours of FMLA leave.69 The
fundamental principle underlying this regulation is that employers may
not require employees to take more FMLA leave than necessary to
address the circumstance that precipitated the need for leave.7°
Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3086, Op. FMLA-83 (Aug. 7, 1996). The term "involuntary leave"
has been used to describe this type of situation, where the employee qualifies for FMLA leave but
has not requested such leave or has expressed a desire to have qualifying leave not count against the
annual FMLA leave entitlement. E.g., Moss v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 737, 740
(M.D. La. 2000). However, the regulations and advisory opinions authorize the employer to
designate FMLA-qualifying leave as such, regardless of the employee's request or consent. This is
therefore a designation issue and is not what is meant by the term "involuntary leave" as it is used in
this Comment.
66. The statute allows for this type of leave in cases where it is medically necessary because of
the employee's own serious health condition or that of a family member. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Both the employee and employer must agree to such leave. Id. Intermittent
leave is leave taken in separate blocks of time for a single qualifying reason; a reduced leave
schedule reduces the employee's usual number of working hours per day or per week. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.203.
67. 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(a).
68. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3034, Op. FMLA-42 (Aug. 23, 1994).
69. Id.
70. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.203(d), .204(e).
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DOL advisory opinions clarify that it is the employee's need, not the
employer's dictates, that determines the terms of FMLA leave.7 In
August 1994, the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL issued an
advisory opinion regarding intermittent leave in response to a series of
inquiries from an employer. 2 One of the questions the advisory opinion
addressed involved a flight attendant who requested intermittent FMLA
leave to care for a seriously ill parent.73 The employee needed three hours
off every other Friday for two months.74 The three-hour absence caused
the employee to miss her flight assignment for that day.' The employer
wished to know how much leave to charge against the employee's
twelve-week entitlement for these absences.76 In response, the DOL
stated that the employee should be charged only three hours of FMLA
leave per absence.77 The opinion cited regulations providing that an
employer may only charge an employee taking intermittent leave with
the amount of leave actually taken for the FMLA-qualifying reason.78
The DOL issued a second advisory opinion on this topic in July
1997."9 In that case, the DOL examined intermittent FMLA leave for
salaried executive, administrative, and professional employees who are
exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).80 The agency again
concluded that requiring exempt employees to take a full day of leave in
circumstances where the employee does not need a full day to attend to
an FMLA-qualifying need violates FMLA regulations.8 These two
opinions affirm that employers cannot require employees to take FMLA
leave beyond what is necessary to meet the employee's FMLA-
qualifying need.
71. See 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3097, Op. FMLA-89 (July 3, 1997); 99 Wage & Hour
Manual (BNA) 3034, Op. FMLA-42 (Aug. 23, 1994).
72 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3034, Op. FMLA-42 (Aug. 23, 1994).
73. Id.'
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(a) (1994)).
79. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3097, Op. FMLA-89 (July 3, 1997).
80. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
81. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3097, Op. FMLA-89 (July 3, 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.203(d) (1997)). In this situation, requiring exempt employees to use more FMLA leave than
necessary would also violate FLSA regulations. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(l) (1997)).
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C. The Legislative History of the FMLA
In response to a "demographic revolution" 2 in the composition of the
American workforce and the increasing difficulty employees faced in
trying to balance work and family responsibilities,83 Congress introduced
the first family leave legislation in 1985.84 Increasing numbers of women
in the workforce, greater numbers of single-parent households, and the
overall aging of the American population contributed to the tension
employees felt between their jobs and personal obligations." Also,
because other developed countries provide extensive family and medical
leave benefits to employees,86 concerns about maintaining worker
productivity and global competitiveness were instrumental in the
FMLA's development.87 After many years of revisions and compromises,
Congress enacted the FMvILA in 1993, guaranteeing employees a
minimum amount of annual leave to balance the demands of their
personal and professional lives.88
The legislative history of the FMLA affirms a consistent purpose: to
provide both beneficial rights and greater job security for employees with
serious health conditions. 89 The FMLA's legislative history contains
numerous examples of ways in which Congress sought to protect
employee rights. For example, Congress established a "stringent
standard" 9° requiring that employees returning from leave be returned to
the same position or an equivalent position, not merely a comparable or
similar position. 9' Although the FMLA provides an exception to this
restoration provision for certain highly compensated employees, 92
Congress nonetheless mandated that such employees be provided with
82. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (a); see also S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4-7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,6-
9.
84. Zuckman, supra note 9, at 267.
85. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4-7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6-9.
86. Id. at 19-20, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 21-22. Congress noted that among the major
industrialized countries, the average minimum amount of paid leave for medical reasons was twelve
to fourteen weeks. Id. Many countries also provide at least one year of unpaid medical leave. Id.
87. See id. at 11-12, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15-17.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b).
89. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 11-12, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13-14.
90. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 30, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,32.
91. Id.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b).
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continued group health benefits for the duration of the leave period, even
after the employer notifies them that it will deny restoration. 93
Furthermore, Congress modeled the FMLA's remedies and enforcement
mechanisms after those of the FLSA.94 Because of this explicit reference
and the similarities between the FLSA and FMLA, courts have looked to
the FLSA and its interpretive case law for guidance in interpreting the
FMLA.95 Courts have overwhelmingly held that the FLSA warrants
liberal construction in favor of employees.96
Some of the legislators who opposed the FMLA did so on grounds
that it was too favorable to employees.97 The legislative history contains
references to comments by legislators noting that the Act "allows
employees almost unrestrained discretion as to when to take leave"9" and
"grants the employee a unilateral right to schedule and take the leave."99
Yet, during the eight years in which Congress crafted the FMLA, it never
explicitly considered the issue of involuntary leave, whereby an
employer places an employee on FMLA leave without the employee
requesting leave. Neither the committee reports submitted in support of
the FMLA"'0 nor the floor debates °' contain any reference to involuntary
leave.
93. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 30-3 1, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 32-33.
94. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 34-35, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 36-38.
95. See, e.g., Frizzell v. S.W. Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
while FMLA does not explicitly grant employees right to jury trial, legislative history of FMLA
indicates its enforcement provisions mirror FLSA; courts have interpreted FLSA to provide
employees with right to jury trial); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 330-32 (N.D. III. 1995)
(holding that identical definitions of "employer" in FMLA and FLSA and similarities between
statutes require finding individual liability for supervisors under FMLA as under FLSA).
96. See, e.g., Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (holding that
FLSA is remedial and must be given liberal construction in accordance with its obvious intent and
purpose); Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding courts should
liberally construe remedial social legislation such as FLSA to fulfill its purpose of protecting
workers).
97. See H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 57, 66-67, 70-72, 75-76 (1993) (delineating H ouse
minority's views on legislation); H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 21 (1993).
98. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. I at 70.
99. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2 at 21.
100. See S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3; H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pts.
1,2.
101. See 139 CONG. REC. 1823-75, 1958-2047, 2158-66 (1993).
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II. JUDICIAL OPINIONS ADDRESSING INVOLUNTARY FMLA
LEAVE
In the eight years since President Clinton signed the FMLA, courts
have decided many cases involving employees' FMLA rights, but few of
these decisions have examined the issue of involuntary leave. The few
involuntary-leave cases decided to date have involved both employees
with and without FMLA-qualifying serious health conditions, a
definition that hinges upon whether the employee is able or unable to
perform essential job functions. Most courts have failed to make this
distinction and have therefore held that employers may place even non-
qualifying employees such as Mr. Keating on FMLA leave reasoning
that no FMLA provision expressly prohibits such a practice.
A. Cases in Which Employees Were Unable To Perform Essential Job
Functions
Two cases purporting to deal with involuntary FMLA leave involved
employees whose serious health conditions prevented them from
performing an essential function of their respective positions and thus
qualified them for FMLA leave. Because these were qualifying
employees, the real issue in these cases was one of designation.° 2
In Moss v. Formosa Plastics Corp.,'03 an employer placed an epileptic
employee on disability leave after the employee suffered epileptic
seizures at work.'c° After receiving conflicting reports regarding the
effect of the employee's medical condition on his ability to perform
essential job functions, the employer decided to terminate the employee
because of his medical problems.105 Instead of firing the employee,
however, the employer placed the employee on FMLA leave to allow
him to "get his situation under control."'" The employer ultimately
terminated the employee, and the employee sued, claiming the employer
violated his FMLA rights by unilaterally forcing him to take twelve
weeks of FMLA leave.'0 7 The court found the employee was unable to
102. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
103. 99 F. Supp. 2d 737 (M.D. La. 2000).
104. Id. at 738-39.
105. Id. at 738.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 740.
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perform the essential functions of his position as a control-panel operator
because he could not respond to emergency situations if rendered
unconscious by a seizure.' The court held that nothing in the FMLA
prohibits employers from requiring employees to take unpaid leave."19
In Harvender v. Norton,"0 a pregnant employee's physician advised
her not to work with or be exposed to chemicals during her pregnancy.'I'
When budget constraints prevented the employer from placing the
employee on light duty, the employer instead placed her on FMLA
leave."' The employee had not requested leave; in fact, she objected to
it."' She brought suit claiming the employer knowingly and intentionally
violated the FMLA by committing a prohibited act under § 2615(a)(1),' l4
which prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or denying
employee FMLA rights. The court reasoned that whether an employee
requested FMLA leave is irrelevant because the statute does not specify
that FMLA leave be granted only when the employee wishes it."5
Instead, the court held if the required conditions for leave are met,
namely that the employee is eligible and has an FMLA-qualifying reason
for leave, the employer is required to provide the employee with leave
and may designate it as FMLA leave." 6
108. Id. at 742-43.
109. Id. at 741 (citing Harvender v. Norton, No. 96-CV-653, 1997 WL 793085, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1I, 1997)). Under the employment at-will doctrine, employers may place employees on unpaid
leave, just as they may terminate them, for any reason or for no reason. See, e.g., Smoot v. Boise
Cascade, 942 F.2d 1408, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that, under Washington law, employer
generally may terminate employment contract of indefinite duration at any time, with or without
cause). Id. However, there is a distinction between simply placing an employee on unpaid leave and
placing an employee on unpaid FMLA leave in that the latter deprives the employee of a statutory
right to a guaranteed amount of annual leave. Congress demonstrated its intent to grant employees
this unique right and protect it by its inclusion of § 2615, prohibiting employer interference with,
restraint of, and denial of the exercise of these rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1994).
110. No. 96-CV-653, 1997 WL 793085 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1997).
111. Id. at *I.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *7.
116. Id. at *7-8. Under the FMLA regulations and DOL advisory opinions regarding designation
of leave, such designation would not be mandatory. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3044, Op.
FMLA-49 (Oct. 27, 1994). Thus, an employer would be permitted, but not required, to count the
leave against the employee's annual twelve-week entitlement.
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B. Involuntary-Leave Cases in Which Employees Were Willing and
Able To Perform Essential Job Functions
To date, only one circuit court has examined a case involving
involuntary FMLA leave where an employer placed a non-qualifying
employee on FMLA leave." 7 Yet, the Sixth Circuit declined to decide
the involuntary-leave issue and rendered an unpublished decision.118 In
Hicks v. Leroy's Jewelers,"9 a pregnant employee requested FMLA
leave to begin immediately after the birth of her child. 2 ' Prior to the
birth, the employee spent one night in a hospital because of a kidney
infection. 2' The employer designated the employee as being on FMLA
leave as of the date of her hospitalization for the kidney infection, despite
the fact the employee indicated she was willing and able to work for the
final month remaining prior to her delivery date. 2 Her twelve-week
leave thus expired one month earlier than it would have as originally
scheduled. After the expiration of the leave period, as calculated from the
earlier date of hospitalization, the employer terminated the employee
when she did not return to work.'
The employee claimed that by placing her on involuntary leave at the
time of hospitalization the employer interfered with her FMLA rights and
thus violated § 2615(a)(1). 24 The employee maintained that her hospi-
talization for a kidney infection did not meet the regulatory definition of
a serious health condition; thus, because she was not eligible for FMLA
leave, she argued that her employer could not place her on FMLA
leave. 125 The trial court found that the employee's initial hospitalization
was an FMLA-qualifying absence that made her eligible for FMLA
leave. 126 The trial court further concluded that because the employee was
117. Hicks v. Leroy's Jewelers, Inc., 225 F.3d 659, text available at 2000 WL 1033029 (6th Cir.
July 17, 2000) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1084 (Feb. 20, 2001) (No. 00-
891).
118. Id. at *4.
119. 225 F.3d 659, text available at 2000 WL 1033029 (6th Cir. July 17,2000) (unpublished table
decision), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1084 (Feb. 20, 2001) (No. 00-891).
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *2. The employee also claimed the employer violated the FMLA by failing to restore
her to her position. Id.
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id.
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eligible for FMLA leave, the employer had authority to place her on
involuntary FMLA leave. 7 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the
employee's stated willingness and ability to work created an issue of
material fact regarding her eligibility for FMLA leave; therefore the trial
court had erred in granting summary judgment to the employer on that
ground. However, the court declined to remand on this issue because it
was able to resolve the case on unrelated grounds.'28
A federal district court in Texas was the first to hear a case on the
issue of involuntary FULA leave. In Love v. City of Dallas, 9 the
employer placed two employees who suffered from carpal tunnel
syndrome on light duty to conform to restrictions necessitated by their
medical condition. 30 These employees were willing and arguably able to
perform the essential functions of their positions.' The employer
subsequently issued a new policy stating that it would not allow
employees to remain on limited duty indefinitely' When the employer
determined that the two employees were unable to return to regular duty,
it placed them on involuntary FMLA leave for a total of twenty-four
weeks over two years.
133
The employees argued that the employer violated their FMLA rights
by placing them on involuntary FMLA leave because, without a
qualifying serious health condition, they were not entitled to FMLA
leave.134 The employer argued that the employees failed to state a claim
under the FMLA because nothing in the statute prohibits the practice of
placing employees on involuntary FMLA leave.' 35 The court dismissed
the employees' assertion that nothing in the FMLA or its regulations
127. Id.
128. Id. at *4. The court held that the employee's failure to return to work after the expiration of
her twelve-week leave period, when calculated either from the original date her leave was to begin
or from the date of her hospitalization, precluded any recovery under the FMLA. Id.
129. No. 3:96-CV-0532-R, 1997 WL 278126 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 1997).
130. Id. at *1.
131. The employees' ability to perform raises issues of reasonable accommodation under the
ADA. See supra note 12. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
132. Love, 1997 WL 278126, at * 1.
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id. at *6. The court had "difficulty" with the employees arguing in the same motion that they
were disabled under the ADA but did not have a serious health condition under the FMLA. Id. The
ADA's definition of disability is markedly different from the FMLA's definition of serious health
condition; thus there is no inconsistency in such an argument. See supra note 12.
135. Love, 1997 WL 278126, at *5-6.
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allows employers to put employees on involuntary FMLA leave.'36 As in
Moss, the court instead found it more relevant that "nothing in the statute
prohibits an employer from doing so.' 37
Burton v. Neumann 38 also involved an employer placing an employee
on involuntary FMLA leave when the employee was willing and able to
perform job functions. The employee in Burton suffered from iritis.'39
Iritis is a permanent condition affecting the eyes and characterized by
recurring periods of inflammation interspersed with periods of months or
years without symptoms. 4 ° The employee's doctor determined that
work-related stress contributed to the onset of symptomatic episodes, and
the employee sought to discuss with her employer reasonable
accommodations that might reduce her stress level at work.'4' In
response, her employer "summarily" placed her on involuntary FMLA
leave. 14' The employee claimed involuntary leave was unlawful under the
FMLA. 4 She also claimed the employer violated the FMLA by failing
to restore her to her position following placement on involuntary FMLA
leave. 44 First, citing Love, the court held that the FMILA does not
prohibit involuntary leave, and thus, the employee had no basis for an
involuntary-leave claim."' Second, although the employee's physician
provided a letter stating there was no medical reason why she could not
continue working, with or without reasonable accommodation, the
employee failed to submit this required letter in a timely fashion.' 46
Accordingly, she lost her FMLA claim for failure to restore her to her
position. 1
47
136. Id. at *6.
137. Id. (emphasis in original). While the court found that the practice of involuntary FMLA
leave does not violate the provisions of the FMLA, it stated that such a practice could be an adverse
employment action for which a plaintiffmay have a cause of action under another statute such as the
ADA. Id.; see also supra note 12.
138. 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1138 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 1999).
139. Id. at 1139.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1140.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1139.
144. Id.
145. Burton, 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1140-42 (citing Love v. City of Dallas, No. 3:96-
CV-0532-R, 1997 WL 278126 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 1997)).
146. Id. at 1141-42.
147. Id. at 1142.
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I. EMPLOYERS WHO PLACE EMPLOYEES WHO CAN
PERFORM THEIR ESSENTIAL JOB FUNCTIONS ON
INVOLUNTARY FMLA LEAVE INTERFERE WITH
EMPLOYEE FMLA RIGHTS
Courts deciding involuntary FMLA leave cases have wrongly held
that the FMLA permits employers to place employees who are able to
perform essential job functions on involuntary FMLA leave. The central
issue courts must examine in involuntary-leave cases is whether the
employee actually meets the statutory prerequisites for leave, particularly
the requirement that the employee be unable to perform an essential job
function of his or her position.' Instead, most courts have focused on
the fact that the text of the statute and its regulations are silent on the
issue of involuntary leave. They have interpreted this silence to allow
employers to force non-qualifying employees to take involuntary FMLA
leave.
However, courts must resolve the ambiguity created by legislative
silence by examining the language of the statute, the statutory scheme as
a whole, the administrative regulations and interpretive guidance, and its
legislative history. Such an analysis reveals not only Congress's intent to
provide employees greater job security by guaranteeing them the right to
a minimum amount of family and medical leave, but also that allowing
employers to place employees who are willing and able to perform their
essential job functions on involuntary FULA leave unlawfully interferes
with the employees' FMLA rights. If the requirements for FMLA leave
are met, the issue becomes one of designation, and the employer may
choose to designate FMLA-qualifying leave as such and count it against
an employee's annual entitlement. However, if the prerequisites for leave
are not met, an employer may neither grant nor impose FULA leave.'49
148. The Hicks court alluded to this distinction and noted that it is an issue of material fact in
determining whether involuntary FMLA leave is permissible. See Hicks v. Leroy's Jewelers, Inc.,
225 F.3d 659, No. 98-6596, 2000 WL 1033029, at *3 (6th Cir. July 17, 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
CL 1084 (Feb. 20,2001) (No. 00-891).
149. In borderline cases where it is unclear whether the statutory requirements for leave have been
met, there may be a reasonable accommodation issue for employees who qualify under the ADA.
See supra note 12. Employees who do not meet the ADA's stringent definition of disability may be
left unprotected by either the ADA or the FMLA. In light of the statute's stated purpose of giving
employees with serious health conditions greater job security, courts must not permit employdrs to
use the FMLA as a weapon against employees in these types of borderline cases to precipitate
termination of their employment.
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A. Employers May Not Place Non-Qualifying Employees on
Involuntary FMLA Leave
The FMLA prohibits employers from placing employees who are
capable of performing their essential job functions on involuntary FMLA
leave. Case law interpreting § 2615(a)(1) suggests that placing non-
qualifying employees on involuntary FMLA leave interferes with
employees' FMLA rights. The statutory scheme as a whole reveals
Congress's strong intent to protect employee rights; because involuntary
FMLA leave interferes with employee FMLA rights, it compromises the
structural integrity of the Act. Finally, allowing involuntary leave
contradicts the command of the statute's construction provisions that the
Act be broadly construed in favor of protecting employee leave rights.
1. Involuntary Leave Violates § 2615(a)(1) As Construed by Case Law
An employer who places an employee on involuntary FMLA leave
interferes with the employee's FMLA rights and thus violates
§ 2615(a)(1). In Mardis v. Central National Bank & Trust of Enid, the
Tenth Circuit construed interference with FMLA rights to prohibit
employers from requiring employees to forfeit employment benefits in
exchange for being granted FMLA leave.'50 In Williams v. Shenango.5'
and Sherry v. Protection, Inc.,52 the district courts also concluded that
this provision of the statute prohibits employers from interfering with an
employee's scheduling of FMLA leave. 53 These courts held that
delaying or postponing the employee's FMLA leave request constituted
interference, even where the employee was ultimately granted FMLA
leave. '54
Placing an employee on involuntary FMLA leave in essence requires
the employee to forfeit his or her right to use that FMLA leave at a later
date. For example, when Mr. Keating's employer placed him on twelve
150. Mardis v. Cent. Nat'l Bank & Trust of Enid, 173 F.3d 864, text available at 1999 WL
218903 (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 1999) (unpublished table decision); see also supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
151. 986 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
152. 981 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. I11. 1997).
153. Williams, 986 F. Supp. at 320-21; Sherry, 981 F. Supp. at 1136; see also supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text.
154. Williams, 986 F. Supp. at 320-21; Sherry, 981 F. Supp. at I 136; see also supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text.
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weeks of involuntary FMLA leave, it precluded him from using that
FMLA leave later in the year, were he or his wife to suffer from a serious
medical condition.' Alternatively, the practice of involuntary FMLA
leave interferes with the employee's ability to schedule his or her FMLA
leave, which the statute also prohibits.156 For example, in Hicks, the
employee was unable to schedule FMLA leave following the birth of her
child because her employer had placed her on FMLA leave when she
arguably did not have a qualifying serious health condition.
The Love and Burton courts failed to recognize this statutory
violation. In both cases, the employees were arguably willing and able to
perform the essential functions of their respective positions and thus did
not qualify for FMLA leave.5 7 Because these courts failed to appreciate
that these were non-qualifying employees, they also failed to recognize
that by putting non-qualifying employees on FMLA leave, the employers
in Love and Burton were interfering with the employees' right to
schedule and use their FMLA leave. Judicial interpretation of
§ 2615(a)(1) makes clear that the statute prohibits this type of
interference; thus these employers violated their employees' FMLA
rights.
2. Involuntary Leave Compromises the Structural Integrity of the
FMLA
Examination of the FMLA's entire statutory and regulatory scheme
reveals that allowing employers to place employees who are able to
perform their essential job functions on involuntary leave violates
§ 2615(a)(1). This scheme is based on the employee's initiation of the
leave process, either by requesting leave in advance where the need is
foreseeable, or by providing the employer with adequate notice of the
need for leave where it is unforeseeable. 5 ' The designation procedures,
the recordkeeping procedures, and even the sample forms are all based
on having the employer respond to the employee's initial leave request or
notification.'59 No other manner of initiating the leave process appears in
155. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
157. See Burton v. Neumann, 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1138, 1140-41 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8,
1999); Love v. City of Dallas, No. 3:96-CV-0532-R, 1997 WL 278126, at * 1-2 (N.D. Tex. May 14,
1997).
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302-.303 (2000).
159. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.208, .500, app. D.
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either the statute or the regulations.' 6° Allowing employers to place
employees who are able to perform essential job functions on involuntary
leave is an entirely different process that is outside the procedures
described in the statute. Congress wanted employees, not employers, to
initiate the leave process; thus, only employees may avail themselves of
their FMLA rights when they deem it necessary.
In addition, the statutory scheme provides further evidence of
Congress's intent to instill leave rights in employees and protect those
rights. For example, the FMLA's strong enforcement provisions and
generous remedies, including a presumption of double damages, shows
Congress's intent that employers not interfere with employees' FMLA
rights.'6' Likewise, by modeling these enforcement provisions after the
FLSA, 162 a statute which protects employees' most basic rights regarding
wages and hours, Congress unmistakably signaled that it meant to
guarantee employees FMLA rights of equal strength and provide strong
incentives for employers to honor such rights. Finally, by making
employee rights mandatory and employer rights merely permissive,
63
Congress demonstrated that employee FMLA rights are stronger than
employer FMLA rights and should thus control.
Courts that have examined involuntary FMLA leave have failed to
review closely the entire statutory scheme. The Love and Burton courts
looked only to whether the statute contained a provision regarding in-
voluntary FMLA leave. " Finding none, they concluded that involuntary
leave was permissible. 65 These courts failed to recognize that the
statute's silence on this issue creates an ambiguity, and thus failed to
look at the statutory scheme as a whole to resolve this ambiguity. Had
they done so, they would have found that the statutory scheme favors the
creation and protection of employee rights that are stronger than those of
employers. Allowing employers to place employees who are willing and
160. The canon expressio unius est exclusivio alterius ("the expression of one excludes another")
dictates that where a law delineates a specific process for doing something it excludes or prohibits
the use of other processes. See Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 269, 270
(1872).
161. See supra notes 31-36, 43-52, and accompanying text.
162. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying
text.
163. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
164. Love v. City of Dallas, No. 3:96-CV-0532-R, 1997 WL 278126, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 14,
1997); Burton v. Neumann, 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1138, 1140 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 1999).
165. Love, 1997 WL 278126, at *6; Burton, 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1140.
Vol. 76:509, 2001
Involuntary Leave Under the FMLA
able to work on involuntary FMLA leave thus clearly violates the
integrity of the statute as a whole.
3. Permitting Involuntary FMLA Leave Contradicts the Command of
the Statute s Construction Provisions that the FMLA Be Construed
Broadly in Favor ofEmployees
Finally, the construction provisions of the FMLA and its remedial
nature mandate liberal construction of the statute. While the statute does
not explicitly call for liberal construction, §§ 2651-2653 indicate that
courts should construe the FMLA both to maximize employee leave
rights and to encourage employers to offer leave policies more generous
than those contained in the statute. 66 In addition, the legislative history
of the FNILA reveals that the enforcement and remedy provisions of the
statute were modeled after those of the FLSA.167 Courts interpreting the
FLSA have repeatedly held that because the FLSA is a remedial statute,
courts must interpret it liberally to benefit the workers it seeks to
protect. 68 Similarly, because the FMLA is a remedial statute designed to
solve workplace problems involving job security and personal
obligations, courts should liberally interpret it consistent with this stated
purpose and prohibit employers from placing employees who are able to
perform their job functions on involuntary leave.
B. FMLA Regulations Prohibit Employers from Placing Employees
Who Can Perform the Essential Functions of Their Positions on
Involuntary FMLA Leave
Courts examining the issue of involuntary leave have ignored the
DOL's regulations and advisory opinions on designation of leave and
intermittent FMLA leave. One set of regulations and advisory opinions
addresses designation of leave and indicates that an employer may
designate leave as FMLA leave and count it against an employee's
annual allotment when the employee and employer meet all of the
statutory requirements. 69 Another set of regulations and advisory
opinions addresses intermittent leave and indicates that an employer may
166. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653.
167. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 34-36 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 36-38.
168. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Part I.B.I.
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only charge an employee with the amount of FMLA leave necessary to
meet the employee's qualifying need.1 7' Both sets of regulations and
advisory opinions illustrate the broader principle that it is the employee's
need, and whether that need qualifies under the statute, that dictates
whether leave may be taken, and if so, how much. Employers who place
employees who are able to perform their essential job functions on
involuntary FMLA leave violate this principle.
1. Employers May Only Designate Leave as FMLA Leave Where Such
Leave Meets All Statutory Requirements
The regulations and advisory opinions regarding designation of leave
affirm that the employer may not designate leave as FMLA leave and
deduct it from an employee's annual entitlement unless the employee
meets all of the statutory prerequisites. The FMLA regulations give
employers the responsibility of designating leave as FMLA leave. 171 In
1995, the DOL issued an advisory opinion stating that where the
employer is a covered employer, the employee is eligible for leave, and
the reason for leave meets the definition of a serious health condition, the
employer may designate leave as FMLA leave and count it against the
employee's allotment, regardless of whether the employee has requested
it.' Thus, where the employee satisfies the requirements for leave,
including the statutory definition of a serious health condition, which
requires that the employee be unable to perform an essential function of
his or her position,' employers may designate leave as FMLA leave and
deduct it from the employee's annual allotment. 74 It follows that where
the employee does not meet the statutory requirements for leave, such as
not having a serious health condition that prevents him or her from
performing essential job functions, the employer may not designate leave
as FMLA leave.
Case law illustrates this important distinction. For example, in both
Moss v. Formosa Plastics Corp.'75 and Harvender v. Norton, 76 the
170. See supra Part 1.B.2.
171. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 (2000).
172. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3067, Op. FMLA-68 (July 21, 1995); see also supra notes
64-65 and accompanying text.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1994).
174. 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3067, Op. FMLA-68 (July 21, 1995); 29 C.F.R. § 825.208.
175. 99 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (M.D. La. 2000).
176. Harvender v. Norton, No. 96-CV-653, 1997 WL 793085, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1997).
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employees were in fact unable to perform their respective job
functions.' In Moss, the employee's epileptic seizures rendered him
unconscious and thus unable to respond to emergency situations at the
chemical plant where he was a control-panel operator.'78 In Harvender,
the employee's pregnancy precluded her from handling chemicals, which
was an essential function of her position as a lab technician.'79 Thus, their
employers acted in accordance with the FMLA regulations and the
advisory opinion in placing them on FMLA leave. The Hicks court
recognized the importance of whether the employee has a qualifying
need and correctly held that summary judgment was inappropriate where
there remained an issue of fact as to whether the employee had an
FMLA-qualifying need for leave.18
0
In contrast, in Love the employees did not have a serious health
condition as defined by the statute. Although the employees suffered
from carpal tunnel syndrome, they were arguably willing and able to
perform their essential job functions.' Likewise, in Burton the
employee was willing and able to perform her essential job functions
with reasonable accommodation. 82 By placing these non-qualifying
employees on involuntary FMLA leave, these employers deprived the
employees of the right to schedule and use their FMLA leave should a
genuine qualifying need arise and thereby unlawfully interfered with the
employees' FMLA rights in violation of § 2615(a)(1).
Furthermore, this distinction between those with a qualifying need and
those without a qualifying need is very important for individuals with
permanent disabilities.8 3 Individuals with permanent disabilities include
177. Moss, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 742; Harvender, 1997 WL 793085, at *7.
178. Moss, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 742-43.
179. Harvender, 1997 WL 793085, at *7.
180. Hicks v. Leroy's Jewelers, Inc., 225 F.3d 659, text available at 2000 WL 1033029, at *3 (6th
Cir. July 17, 2000) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1084 (Feb. 20, 2001) (No.
00-891).
18 1. See Love v. City of Dallas, No. 3:96-CV-0532-R, 1997 WL 278126, at * 1-2 (N.D. Tex. May
14, 1997).
182. Burton v. Neumann, 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1138, 1140-41 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8,
1999).
183. If the employee's permanent condition meets the ADA's definition of a disability, reasonable
accommodation must be granted where it does not place an undue burden on the employer. See
supra note 12. This accommodation could remedy the employee's inability to perform an essential
job function. In the Love decision, while the court denied the employees' claim that their employer
interfered with their FMLA rights when it forced them to take involuntary FMLA leave, the court
suggested that putting them on involuntary leave may have given rise to a claim under another
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Mr. Keating, whose brain injury resulted in memory impairment, and
potentially the Love employees with carpal tunnel syndrome. 84 Many
such employees have a permanent disability that limits their abilities but
do not suffer from any recurring periods of illness. Without such flare-
ups that meet the FMLA's definition of a serious health condition, the
FMLA simply does not apply. In these situations, if a non-qualifying
employee were to request FMLA leave, the employer would be legally
required to deny such a request. It follows that it is equally impermissible
for an employer to place a non-qualifying employee on FMLA leave. If
the employer needs time to assess whether and how to accommodate an
employee who is disabled, as was the case with Mr. Keating's employer,
putting the non-qualifying employee on involuntary FMLA leave as an
interim measure violates the FMLA. By allowing employers to do
exactly that, an employee who could not request such leave faces the
prospect of twelve weeks without pay and loses the right to use his or her
FMLA leave later in the year should a genuine serious health condition
or other qualifying need arise.
2. Employers May Only Deduct Leave from an Employee's Annual
FMLA Allotment Where There Is a Qualifying Need
Regulations regarding intermittent leave forcefully demonstrate the
principle that the employee must have a qualifying need for FMLA
leave. These regulations dictate that an employer may only charge an
employee taking intermittent leave with the amount of leave necessary to
meet his or her FMLA-qualifying need. 85 The DOL has issued two
advisory opinions clarifying this regulation.'86 These opinions affirm that
where an employee is taking FMLA leave on a reduced time or
intermittent basis, the employer may not force the employee to take more
statute such as the ADA. Love, 1997 WL 278126, at *6. While it is true that failure to accommodate
ADA-covered employees would give rise to such a claim, it does not follow that involuntary leave is
solely an ADA issue.
184. The Love court held that the employees had presented evidence sufficient to create an issue
of fact regarding whether their carpal tunnel syndrome met the ADA's definition of disability. 1997
WL 278126, at *6.
185. 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(a) (2000).
186. See 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3097, Op. FMLA-89 (July 3, 1997); 99 Wage & Hour
Manual (BNA) 3034, Op. FMLA-42 (Aug. 23, 1994). For further discussion of these opinions, see
supra Part 1.B.2.
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leave than is necessary. 8 7 For example, an employee who needs to take a
few hours of leave for a qualifying medical appointment in the morning
cannot be charged with an entire day's worth of leave, even if the
employee works on a plane, train, or boat and is unable to return to the
worksite after the appointment.' Therefore, if an employer cannot
require an employee to take more FMLA leave than actually necessary
for a qualifying need, it follows that the employer cannot require an
employee to take FMLA leave where the employee has no qualifying
need. To hold otherwise would allow absurd results: an employee whose
two-hour doctor's appointment for a qualifying serious health condition
caused him to miss a full day's work assignment would be charged with
two hours of FMLA leave, while an employee with no qualifying serious
health condition could nonetheless be charged with up to twelve weeks
of FMLA leave.
C. Employers Who Place Non-Qualifying Employees on Involuntary
FMLA Leave Violate § 2615(a)(1)
Finally, the legislative history of the FMLA suggests that employers
may not place employees who are able to perform their essential job
functions on involuntary FMLA leave. The Love and Burton courts failed
to review thoroughly the history of the FMLA to ascertain true
legislative intent. Indeed, the Burton court made no reference to the
statute's legislative history or its purpose,'89 and the Love court only
briefly mentioned the demographic reasons that led to the statute's
enactment. 19 Neither of these courts recognized that permitting em-
ployers to place employees who are able to perform their essential job
functions on involuntary FMLA leave undermines the FMLA's stated
purpose of providing greater employee job security.
Congress enacted the FMLA as a remedial statute in response to
demographic trends that made it difficult for workers to balance the
competing demands of their personal and professional lives.91
187. See 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3097, Op. FMLA-89; 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA)
3034, Op. FMLA-42; see also supra Part I.B.2.
188. See 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 3097, Op. FMLA-89; 99 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA)
3034, Op. FMLA-42.
189. Burton v. Neumann, 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1138 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 1999).
190. Love v. City of Dallas, No. 3:96-CV-0532-R, 1997 WL 278126, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 14,
1997).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994); see also supra notes 82-87.
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Congress's primary purpose in enacting the FMLA was to provide
employees greater job security by granting them this right to leave. 192 As
shown in the Love and Burton cases and in Mr. Keating's case,
permitting involuntary FMLA leave in fact results in less job security,
especially for employees with disabilities that may place them at risk of
falling victim to their employer's use of the FMLA as a sword to
precipitate their resignation. Even if an employer does not terminate an
employee after a period of involuntary FMLA leave, that employee's
future job security will be at risk because he or she will be unable to take
FMLA leave later that year should a true qualifying need arise. Had the
Love and Burton courts delved into the legislative history when
examining the issue of involuntary leave and given greater consideration
to the social context in which Congress passed the FMLA, they would
not have allowed employers to place employees who are able to perform
their job functions on involuntary FILA leave.
Furthermore, the Love and Burton courts failed to consider the
undesirable social consequences of permitting employers to place
employees on FMLA leave involuntarily. Allowing employers to place
employees on involuntary FMLA leave results in undue hardship on
employees who are forced to go without pay for the duration of any such
leave.'93 Because employees in this situation cannot collect unem-
ployment benefits,'94 they have no source of income and may be forced
to quit their jobs to find new positions. Thus, permitting involuntary
leave reduces an employee's job security, which directly contradicts the
statute's express purpose of giving employees greater job security.' 9 5
Similarly, under the rationale of the Love and Burton courts,
employers may use involuntary FMLA leave as a pretext for terminating
"undesirable" employees who have permanent disabilities"' or who have
a family member with such problems. The facts in Burton suggested this
type of covert disability discrimination, where the employer summarily
placed the employee on leave as soon as she expressed a desire to discuss
192. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614.
193. While the employee may choose or the employer may require the employee to substitute
accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, leave guaranteed by the FMLA is unpaid leave. Id.
§§ 2612(c)-(d); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.207 (2000).
194. Because an employer who places an employee on involuntary FMLA leave has not
terminated the employee, the employee is generally ineligible for unemployment benefits. See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.310 (2000).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
196. See supra notes 12 & 183.
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reasonable accommodations for her health problems.'97 When employers
place employees, particularly disabled employees, on involuntary, unpaid
leave, the employees are likely to face financial hardship and may have
no choice but to seek other employment. By using involuntary FMLA
leave, the employer can get rid of an employee without going through the
disability-accommodation process and without terminating the employee,
thereby avoiding the risk of discriminatory-discharge allegations.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the eight arduous years required for passage, the FMLA had
one central purpose: to create and protect leave rights guaranteeing
employees a minimum amount of unpaid leave in times of family or
medical need. With such rights, employees would no longer be forced to
choose between attending to their most important personal needs and
keeping their jobs. Despite its detailed history, provisions, and
procedures, the FMLA fails to address the practice of employers putting
employees who are willing and able to perform essential job functions on
involuntary FMLA leave. Congress probably never contemplated such a
practice. However, courts examining the issue of involuntary leave have
concluded, with little analysis, that the FMLA's silence on the issue
unequivocally permits the practice. Yet, the language of the statute, the
overall statutory and regulatory scheme, the legislative history, and
policy concerns are all evidence that Congress intended the FMLA to be
a shield for employees, protecting their basic rights and affording them
greater job security. The DOL's regulations and advisory opinions
explicitly effectuate this intent. Therefore, employers who use invol-
untary FMLA leave as a sword against employees who are able to
perform their essential job functions, causing them financial hardship and
precipitating their job separation, unlawfully interfere with employees'
FMLA rights.
197. Burton v. Neumann, 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1138, 1140 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 1999).
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